Imagine you come out of a store in which you just bought yourself a book. If I would ask you who chose the book you would most likely say I did! And if I would then ask you whether that was a conscious decision and even more so whether you are a conscious being, you would probably look at me like I have gone mad (rightfully so). But ultimately you would admit to yourself that you think precisely that, namely that you believe that you made this decision consciously. But how about walking out of a store and feeling as if you did not actually want to buy that? Like the times that you just wanted to buy some toothpaste but came back with three candles and a new pen? Maybe this example doesn’t fit you personally but I am sure you had the feeling before that you did something you actually didn’t want to do and afterwards felt like you did not really make the decision that you want to do that, but it happened anyways. How about then? Were these your own, conscious, decisions?
You might all answer differently to this question, and that is really representative of the current views on free will: the world of science is divided by the question of how much of our decision-making is free. Let’s take a walk around the different camps that all have their own view on free will in (psychological) science.
First, the hardliners, who are called determinists, believe that all events, including the future, are entirely determined by previous causes. All mental phenomena and actions are – directly or indirectly – causally produced by previous events. Very important here is that these events lie beyond the control of the person (often called the agent). This view leads to a challenge: the question of free will. Incompatibilism follows that if determinism is true, free will cannot exist. But you could also see it from a more determined view, that of the extremists (hard determinism), and say that determinism is true, thus free will does not exist.
The opposing camp to this is called libertarianism and follows that because free will exists, determinism must be false. This view requires that, because of free will, human beings act uncaused by anything other than by themselves (they must be what is called “causa sui”). And then there’s the “coward option” for those who do not want to decide, called compatibilism. It claims that free will exists, despite determinism being true. It also sounds intuitively irritating, but bare with me, I will come back to it.
So, under which conditions would we attribute free will to other people typically?
As Arendt said “a freedom of choice that arbitrates and decides between two given things […] and whose choice is predetermined by motive”, which basically just means that you yourself have to have the ability to do otherwise – by your own choice. So the first condition is clear: You have to be able to do otherwise. To be free, one needs at least two alternatives of action to choose from. The second condition is also quite intuitive, it is the control over one’s choices. To be free, one must be the agent of one’s choices, without having the interference of other individuals or mechanisms that are outside of one’s reach. It also includes the feeling of agency, which means one must feel like the “owner” of one’s decisions and actions. This can also be called conscious control. The third one is responsiveness to reasons. To be free, decision-making must be rationally motivated and not be the effect of random choice. This is also called conscious reason-responsiveness.
A compatibilist would say that a choice is free when it is caused by one’s conscious desires (free will), however, the desires themselves are determined by the laws of physics (determinism). So, now we are back again at: Free will exists, although determinsm is true (coward!). This means, however, that free will needs conscious mental processes. This brings us to one, in my opinion rather unscientific (and untestable) view: Epiphenomenalism. This view claims that certain conscious processes seem to be causally relevant. So seemingly causing something, like an action (one example for such a process would be intention formation), but not actually playing any causal role in the action production. Instead, our choices and decisions are guided completely by unconscious processes. There are two sub-camps within epiphenomenalism. Metaphysical epiphenomenalism states that causation is entirely carried out by neural processes and that conscious mental processes are only epiphenomenal (so they just exist with no influence). Modular epiphenomenalism, however, claims that the processes that are involved in conscious decisions are not correctly “hooked” onto the processes that cause behaviour (i.e. they come too late).
Of course, our beloved notion of free will is challenged when we believe in epiphenomenalism, as this would mean that unconscious rather than conscious processes produce our behaviour. Thus this behaviour cannot be based on conscious control and cannot reflect a response to reason. This would lead you to believe that none of the decisions you make are actually out of your own free will, as you were logically not able to have free will.
Now, I know this is a hard pill to swallow and one you certainly do not have to agree with. You just have to decide which camp you like most. And don’t worry, no matter which one you choose, there will always be a smart researcher in your camp to help you defend your views.
Photo by Sarah Laszlo
References
– Dorato, M. (2002). Determinism, chance, and freedom. Between chance and choice: interdisciplinary perspectives on determinism, 339-69.
– Gallagher, S. (2006). Where’s the action? Epiphenomenalism and the problem of free will. Does consciousness cause behavior, 109-124.
– Jacobittr, S. (2017). Hannah Arendt and the will. In Hannah Arendt (pp. 201-224). Routledge.
– Watson, G. (1987). Free action and free will. Mind, 96(382), 145-172.
Photo by Sarah Laszlo
Imagine you come out of a store in which you just bought yourself a book. If I would ask you who chose the book you would most likely say I did! And if I would then ask you whether that was a conscious decision and even more so whether you are a conscious being, you would probably look at me like I have gone mad (rightfully so). But ultimately you would admit to yourself that you think precisely that, namely that you believe that you made this decision consciously. But how about walking out of a store and feeling as if you did not actually want to buy that? Like the times that you just wanted to buy some toothpaste but came back with three candles and a new pen? Maybe this example doesn’t fit you personally but I am sure you had the feeling before that you did something you actually didn’t want to do and afterwards felt like you did not really make the decision that you want to do that, but it happened anyways. How about then? Were these your own, conscious, decisions?
You might all answer differently to this question, and that is really representative of the current views on free will: the world of science is divided by the question of how much of our decision-making is free. Let’s take a walk around the different camps that all have their own view on free will in (psychological) science.
First, the hardliners, who are called determinists, believe that all events, including the future, are entirely determined by previous causes. All mental phenomena and actions are – directly or indirectly – causally produced by previous events. Very important here is that these events lie beyond the control of the person (often called the agent). This view leads to a challenge: the question of free will. Incompatibilism follows that if determinism is true, free will cannot exist. But you could also see it from a more determined view, that of the extremists (hard determinism), and say that determinism is true, thus free will does not exist.
The opposing camp to this is called libertarianism and follows that because free will exists, determinism must be false. This view requires that, because of free will, human beings act uncaused by anything other than by themselves (they must be what is called “causa sui”). And then there’s the “coward option” for those who do not want to decide, called compatibilism. It claims that free will exists, despite determinism being true. It also sounds intuitively irritating, but bare with me, I will come back to it.
So, under which conditions would we attribute free will to other people typically?
As Arendt said “a freedom of choice that arbitrates and decides between two given things […] and whose choice is predetermined by motive”, which basically just means that you yourself have to have the ability to do otherwise – by your own choice. So the first condition is clear: You have to be able to do otherwise. To be free, one needs at least two alternatives of action to choose from. The second condition is also quite intuitive, it is the control over one’s choices. To be free, one must be the agent of one’s choices, without having the interference of other individuals or mechanisms that are outside of one’s reach. It also includes the feeling of agency, which means one must feel like the “owner” of one’s decisions and actions. This can also be called conscious control. The third one is responsiveness to reasons. To be free, decision-making must be rationally motivated and not be the effect of random choice. This is also called conscious reason-responsiveness.
A compatibilist would say that a choice is free when it is caused by one’s conscious desires (free will), however, the desires themselves are determined by the laws of physics (determinism). So, now we are back again at: Free will exists, although determinsm is true (coward!). This means, however, that free will needs conscious mental processes. This brings us to one, in my opinion rather unscientific (and untestable) view: Epiphenomenalism. This view claims that certain conscious processes seem to be causally relevant. So seemingly causing something, like an action (one example for such a process would be intention formation), but not actually playing any causal role in the action production. Instead, our choices and decisions are guided completely by unconscious processes. There are two sub-camps within epiphenomenalism. Metaphysical epiphenomenalism states that causation is entirely carried out by neural processes and that conscious mental processes are only epiphenomenal (so they just exist with no influence). Modular epiphenomenalism, however, claims that the processes that are involved in conscious decisions are not correctly “hooked” onto the processes that cause behaviour (i.e. they come too late).
Of course, our beloved notion of free will is challenged when we believe in epiphenomenalism, as this would mean that unconscious rather than conscious processes produce our behaviour. Thus this behaviour cannot be based on conscious control and cannot reflect a response to reason. This would lead you to believe that none of the decisions you make are actually out of your own free will, as you were logically not able to have free will.
Now, I know this is a hard pill to swallow and one you certainly do not have to agree with. You just have to decide which camp you like most. And don’t worry, no matter which one you choose, there will always be a smart researcher in your camp to help you defend your views.
References
